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ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT IN OHIO:
NEW DIRECTIONS AFTER DISSOLUTION
WILLIAM Louis TABAC*
R ECENT DECISIONS BY THE OHIO SUPREME COURT will undoubtedly have
significant impact upon post-dissolution alimony and child sup-
port.1 In rejecting basic premises upon which domestic relations courts
have historically ordered such payments, the court has set new direc-
tions. Traditional notions of sex-based roles in the support of the family
have been set aside and new standards, based upon the needs of the
parties and the factual circumstances in particular cases, have been es-
tablished. As a result, the husband's statutory duty to support his wife
and children during marriage2 will no longer govern his responsibili-
ties toward the family following dissolution,3 and neither parent will
be required to support the children beyond the age of majority. 4
These trends represent significant advances in the development of
Ohio matrimonial law. To acquaint the practitioner with these ad-
vances, and to suggest some of the implications of current judicial think-
ing, this Article will review several problem areas in the determination
of post-dissolution alimony and child support.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
Under Ohio law, the husband has a statutory obligation to furnish
support to his wife.5 Although state laws which impose obligations on
the basis of sex are increasingly the subject of attack, virtually every
state has a similar rule.6  This obligation derives from the historical
evolution of the husband-wife relationship. At common law, an unmar-
ried woman was regarded as a full person who could make contracts,
own property, and be sued for torts. Once married, her situation
changed drastically. A married woman was regarded as incompetent to
* B.A., Case Western Reserve University; J.D., George Washington University; Professor,
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
'The Ohio Supreme Court decisions which provide the focus for discussion in this Article
include: Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976) (alimony); Nokes v.
Nokes, 47 Ohio St. 2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 174 (1976) (child support); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 47
Ohio St. 2d 12, 351 N.E.2d 181 (1976) (child support). Also related are court of appeals
decisions in State v..Oppenheimer, 46 Ohio App. 2d 241, 348 N.E.2d 731 (1975), and Hill v.
Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 250 (1973).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
3 Throughout this paper "dissolution" will be used as a generic term to embrace both
divorce, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.01-.18 (Page Supp. 1976) and dissolution of marriage,
OHmO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.61-.65 (Page Supp. 1976), the two methods by which Ohio
citizens may terminate their marriage.
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
5 Id.
6 The rule is typically based upon the husband's obligation to furnish "necessaries" to
his family. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 30-211 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-24 (1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10 (West 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-10 (1971).
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enter contracts and to be sued for her torts. Although she could retain
ownership over real property, the rights to personal property and the
profits derived from realty were vested in the husband by operation of
law.'
The view that the husband is the natural ruler of the family was re-
flected in still another common law rule. It was uniformly held that the
husband should be responsible for the management of marital property
since he was the principal contributor toward its accumulation.' To
protect the wife, the same courts held that she should be permitted to
count on her husband for support, hence the common law duty of the
husband to support his wife.9
The common law rule' obligating a husband to support his wife led
to the recognition of a similar obligation to the children. While the
husband was left to his devices to earn money and accumulate prop-
erty to subsidize the marriage, the wife would keep house and care for
the children. Since the wife was executing the traditional mother's re-
sponsibility by staying home and not working, the husband was also as-
signed the duty of supporting the children, a duty, then, that was a
natural concomitant of his obligation to support his wife."
These obligations were said to continue after dissolution of the
mairiage and were enforced, through agreement of the parties or court
order, by way of alimony and child support. The "winding up" or alimony
phase of the marriage might take one of the following forms:
(1) a single transfer of a specified amount of cash, property,
or both, commonly referred to as a "lump sum property
settlement.' 12
2 F. POLLOCI & F. MArrLAND, Ti HisTorY OF ENGLISH LAW 403-409 (2d ed. 1898, re-
issued 1968); Radin, The Common Law of The Family, 6 NAT'L L. LIB., LEGAL REL. 79, 175
(1939); H. CLAR, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 220 (1968).
8 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 405-06; H. CLAm, supra note 7, at 219-220.
' See note 7 supra.
10 The civil law approaches these matters from a somewhat different direction. The
marriage is viewed as a partnership in which both partners contribute economically to the
marital regime. See generally C. FOOTE, L. LEVY & S. SANDERS, FAMILY LAW 317-321 (1976).
The form of the marital contribution - money, household services, or other contribution - is
not controlling, since in the civil law or community property view the contribution of both
parties is necessary for the accumulation of a marital estate. Thus, upon dissolution of the
marriage the wife is entitled to a share in the marital property, a share which in some
community property states amounts to fifty percent. See, e.g., TEX. FAm. CODE ANN., tit. 1,
§ 3.63 (Vernon 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (Smith-Hurd 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.58 (West Supp. 1977); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (Supp. 1977). In Colorado
the marital property is divided in such proportions as the court deems just after examing
several relevant factors, such as "the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; . . . the value of
the property set apart to each spouse; . . . [and] the economic circumstances of each
spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective." COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-113 (Supp. 1977). At least one community property state has equalized the respon-
sibility for management of the marital estate, so that the husband and wife have an identical
right to dispose of marital property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1977).
" In Ohio, the husband's duty to furnish support to his children is defined in the same
statutory section which defines his obligations toward his wife. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
11 This type of 'transfer may be worded in the separation agreement as follows:
[Vol, 26:395
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(2) a periodic transfer of a specified amount of cash, prop-
erty, or both, commonly referred to as a "lump sum property
settlement payable in installments."13
(3) a periodic cash transfer terminable on some uncertain
but specified event or events commonly referred to as "ali-
mony." 4
(4) a single transfer of a specified amount of cash, prop-
erty, or both, plus a periodic cash transfer, terminable on some
uncertain but specified event or events, commonly referred to
as a "lump sum property settlement and alimony. "15
(5) a periodic transfer of a specified amount of cash, prop-
erty, or both, plus a periodic cash transfer, terminable on some
uncertain but specified event or events,* commonly referred
to as a "property settlement payable in installments and ali-
mony."16
"'SUPPORT OF WIFE. In full and complete settlement and satisfaction of any and all past,
present, and future claims and rights of the wife for support and maintenance, or alimony,
husband has paid and delivered to wife the sum of $_ receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged." MILLICAN, WEST'S OHIO PrAcncE § 3028 (1975).
1' The agreement would typically state: "SUPPORT OF WIFE. In full and complete
settlement and satisfaction of any and all past, present, and future claims and rights of
the wife for support and maintenance, or for alimony, husband agrees to pay to wife the sum
of $_ in equal monthly installments of $_ commencing for the first such monthly
installment on the day of - 19_ and continuing thereafter until the entire
amount is paid in full. The unpaid balance shall be payable without interest, provided that
if the husband defaults in any such payment that payment shall bear interest at_-_% per
annum, computed annually, being_____% per month." Id. § 3030.
14 The agreement may be worded: "SUPPORT OF WIFE. In full and complete settle-
ment and satisfaction of any and all past, present, and future claims and rights of the wife
for support and maintenance, or alimony, permanent, temporary, pendente lite, in changing
expenses, attorneys fees, and court costs, husband agrees to pay to wife the sum of $_
per month, commencing for the first payment on the___day of--, 19_ and monthly
thereafter until terminated as hereinafter provided." Id. § 3031.
15 An example of this type of transfer may be found in the separation agreement involved
in Wolfe v. Wolfe, quoted in part by the court as follows:
Item 9 - In satisfaction of [Mr.] Wolfe's obligation to support and maintain
Mrs. Wolfe, [Mr.] Wolfe shall pay to Mrs. Wolfe for her support and maintenance
• . . $35,000 . . . per year. . . . The liability of [Mr.] Wolfe for the payment set
forth in this paragraph shall cease upon the happening of whichever of the follow-
ing events shall occur first: (a) the remarriage of the wife; (b) the death of the wife.
This obligation shall be binding upon and be a charge upon the estate of Wolfe and
upon his executors, administrators and legal representatives in the event that [Mr.]
Wolfe shall predecease Mrs. Wolfe ...
Item 10 - As a division of property and in further satisfaction of [Mr.] Wolfe's
obligation to support and maintain Mrs. Wolfe and in addition to the monthly ali-
mony payments required to be paid by [Mr.] Wolfe, [Mr.] Wolfe shall pay to Mrs.
Wolfe the sum of . . . $350,000 ...
• . . The obligation of [Mr.] Wolfe for these payments shall survive his death
and shall be binding upon his estate.
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 400, 350 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1976) (omissions by the
court). See, e.g., In re Kuchenbecker's Estate, 4 I11. App. 2d 314, 124 N.E.2d 52 (1955);
Johnson v. Every, 93 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1957). In Ohio, in order to determine whether
such payments are intended to continue after the death of the obligor, it is necessary to
examine the entire contract and to read it as a whole. Billow v. Billow, 97 Ohio App. 277,
283, 125 N.E.2d 558, 561.
'6 For example, item ten of the separation agreement involved in Wolfe v. Wolfe, quoted
in note 15 supra, could have been payable in fixed installments rather than in a lump sum.
1977]
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Once a transfer of property, cash, or both is ordered by the court,
problems may arise concerning the continued enforceability of the
award. Is the husband's obligation to transfer property dischargeable
in bankruptcy? Can a husband's recalcitrance to make such payments
be remedied through a civil contempt proceeding, or must the wife re-
sort to execution on the judgment against the husband's property? Un-
der what circumstances should the husband be ordered to pay child sup-
port, and for how long?
These and other questions will be considered in the following dis-
cussion. An analysis of recent Ohio decisions on the subject of alimony
will first be presented. The discussion will then turn to the effects of
these decisions in the area of child support.
II. ALIMONY
The award of alimony, and the subsequent modification thereof,
was discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Wolfe v. Wolfe. In antici-
pation of their divorce, Mr. and Mrs. Wolfe executed a separation agree-
ment, 7 the relevant terms of which provided that Mr. Wolfe would
transfer $350,000 as a lump sum property settlement to Mrs. Wolfe. In
addition, Mr. Wolfe was required to pay to Mrs. Wolfe, as "support and
maintenance," $35,000 per year until her death or remarriage. The
couple had no children. Later, when Mrs. Wolfe moved to Arizona and
began cohabiting with a married man, traveling with him and paying
his expenses, Mr. Wolfe sought to be relieved from making further
"alimony payments."'8  The trial court granted defendant's motion to
modify the periodic payments. The judge found that the plaintiff,
through her conduct and cohabitation, had abandoned her right to the
payments. To the trial judge, it was as if she had fulfilled the "remar-
riage" condition of the decree. 9 The court of appeals for Franklin
County reversed, holding that the periodic payment could not be modi-
fied because the trial judge, in his original decree, had not expressly
retained jurisdiction to do so. 20
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held inter alia that jurisdiction to
modify periodic transfers of cash subject to the conditions subsequent of
remarriage or death of the wife will be implied in every decree of divorce or
dissolution.2 ' This rule applies, according to the court, even though the
periodic transfers are contained in a separation agreement, as long as the
17 See note 15 supra.
18 Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 400, 350 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1976). The court
itself placed emphasis upon the word "alimony." Considering the major contribution of
Wolfe v. Wolfe - that it defined and made more precise the concept of post-dissolution
alimony - the court's emphasis was appropriate.
1" The trial judge expressed the opinion that Mrs. Wolfe was "attempting to enjoy all of
the benefits of a marriage by cohabiting with another man and not yet entering into an
actual marriage in order to avoid the loss of alimony." Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d
399, 401, 350 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1976) (quoting from the trial court decision).
20 See 46 Ohio St. 2d at 401, 350 N.E.2d at 416.
21 Wolfe v. Wolf6, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976) (syllabus at 2).
[Vol. 26:395
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agreement has been merged by the court into its decree.2 2 But an alimony
award which constitutes a division of property, the court concluded, is a non-
modifiable property settlement.2 3 Thus, in Wolfe, the $35,000 cash transfer
was modifiable for changed circumstances, 24 but the $350,000 cash transfer
was not.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Paul W. Brown stated that the
trial judge had acted well within the bounds of his discretion to modify,
since on the record Mrs. Wolfe's behavior after the divorce indicated
that she did not really need the annual payments.2 5  Justice Corrigan,
in dissent, contended that Mrs. Wolfe's private life was not a matter for
the trial court to consider. The question before the court, according to
Corrigan, was whether the contingencies that conditioned the payment
of alimony support had occurred. Believing that they had not, Corrigan
asserted that Mr. Wolfe's support obligations to Mrs. Wolfe continued.
The dissenting justice felt that a trial judge's authority to modify sup-
port payments should be read narrowly rather than in the broad man-
ner suggested in the concurring opinions.2 6  Consequently, the chief
dispute among the justices in Wolfe did not concern the disposition of
the case on appeal - it was remanded to the trial court for reconsidera-
tion in light of the rule of implied jurisdiction to modify periodic ali-
mony payments - but rather the sufficiency of changed circumstances
to warrant modification.
The real significance of Wolfe lies in its clarification of the nature
of alimony under Ohio law, a point on which all the justices agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice William B. Brown traced the historical
development of alimony in Ohio, and in a departure from prior case
law, 27 concluded that the responsibilities of the spouses toward each
other are based upon the Ohio alimony statute2 8 and not upon the
statutory obligation of the husband to support his wife during the mar-
riage. According to the court, "although post-marital alimony has been
said to arise out of the husband's duty to support his wife, . . .[tlhe
legal obligation of the husband to furnish support to the wife ceases
22 Id. (syllabus at 4).
23 Id. (syllabus at 1).
24 Though not grounds for automatic termination of such alimony, post-dissolution unchastity
may be considered in a later modification proceeding as relevant to the issue of "continued
need for such alimony and the amount." Id. (syllabus at 3).
25 46 Ohio St. 2d at 422-23, 350 N.E.2d at 427-28.
21 46 Ohio St. 2d at 424, 350 N.E.2d at 428.
27 Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885), Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St. 369
(1901) and Newman v. Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 18 N.E.2d 649 (1954). These cases had
concluded that domestic relations courts could not reserve jurisdiction to modify alimony
when it had been established by a separation agreement subsequently incorporated into a
decree of divorce even when the alimony took the form of support payments to the ex-wife.
As noted in Wolfe, however, the court had taken a step back from this position in Hunt v.
Hunt, 169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959), when it modified support payments to
an ex-wife who had remarried because the ex-husband had "forgotten" to incorporate a re-
marriage clause into the separation agreement.
2' OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1976). This statute authorizes the
granting of alimony on equitable principles to either party in the form of real or personal
1977]
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upon the termination of the marriage relation' 29  Thus, despite its
appellation the Ohio alimony statute is really a property distribution
statute which authorizes the court to liquidate the marriage, that is, to
distribute the marital assets and liabilities. This distribution could be
made as a lump-sum property settlement, "sustenance" paid over an
uncertain period, or both.30  The court also said that "only after a divi-
sion of property is made is the court statutorily authorized to consider
whether an additional amount is needed for sustenance and for what
period will such necessity persist."
3
'
By the terms of the alimony statute, either party may be required by
the court to make transfers of property. 32 In so ordering, the court may
give force to a separation agreement executed by the parties, or fashion
its own order when the parties have been unable to agree.33 The court
stressed in Wolfe, however, that no matter what form these transfers
might take they all amount to "alimony"; either "alimony property
settlement," "alimony sustenance," or both. Furthermore, according
to the Wolfe court when the sustenance payments are "clearly sever-
able" from the property settlement, the trial court has modification
property or both, in either lump sum or periodic payments.
Eleven factors are provided to aid the court in determining the nature, amount, and type
of alimony:
(1) the relative earning abilities of the parties;
(2) the ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties;
(3) the retirement benefits of the parties;
(4) the expectancies and inheritances of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will be
custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the
home;
(7) the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(8) the relative extent of education of the parties;
(9) the relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(10) the property brought to the marriage by either party;
(11) the contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
The statute also allows modification of continuing orders for periodic payments when
justified by changed circumstances. For a discussion of the development of criteria to be
used in formulating post-marital decrees, see Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony
and Property Awards, 43 CIN. L. REV. 133 (1974).
19 46 Ohio St. 2d at 410, 350 N.E. 2d at 421 (quoting Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St.
1, 7 (1877)).
30 46 Ohio St. 2d at 413, 350 N.E. 2d at 422.
31 Id. at 414, 350 N.E. 2d at 423.
32 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1976) provides that the trial court
"may allow alimony as it deems reasonable to either party."
33 Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(A) (Page Supp. 1977). Divorce reform is not
effected solely through legislation, however, as the following suggests:
Even in those states in which alimony is provided by statute for both spouses, the
presumption that a wife should be awarded alimony in all cases, independent of
her financial needs, plays a vital part in the court's determination. Some states
have attempted to prevent this result by statutes requiring a definite showing of
need, but it is likely that the presumption will continue to influence a judge who is
given wide discretion in granting alimony.
Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 CIN. L. REV. 133,
146 (1974).
[Vol. 26:395
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authority; otherwise, it does not. The court concluded with the follow-
ing instruction to lawyers:
[t]he courts and parties have frequently failed to delineate
whether the [alimony] award was for sustenance or consti-
tuted a property division for the reason that such delineation
was not considered important. In holding herein that modifica-
tion jurisdiction continues as to alimony sustenance awards
... we perceive that immeasurable difficulties will arise in
attempting to judicially determine the character of an award
in a given case. Therefore, while we apply the rule here be-
cause the separation is clearly manifested, our holding herein
is to be applied prospectively only to decrees incorporating
separation agreements entered after the date of this judgment.34
Because of its reformulation of Ohio alimony concepts, Wolfe sets
forth serious implications for alimony modification and enforcement
practice. By its holding that indefinite alimony "sustenance" can be
modified for changed circumstances but that alimony "property settle-
ments" cannot be so modified,35 Wolfe seems to confirm the rule that
alimony property settlements can indeed be discharged in bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Act provides in relevant part that alimony is nondis-
chargeable,36 but here, too, the term "alimony" has a technical mean-
ing. The federal courts have concluded that "alimony" under the
Bankruptcy Act refers only to support payments,37 or what would now
be characterized as "sustenance" under Ohio law. Thus, "property
settlements" are not alimony for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and
are therefore dischargeable. The question typically arises when a hus-
band files his petition for bankruptcy and a determination has to be
34 46 Ohio St. 2d at 421, 350 N.E. 2d at 427.
35 Id. at 421-22, 350 N.E.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
30 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970) provides that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as . . . (7) are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or
child." This statute reflects long-standing law:
Although this language was added in 1903 by an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Act, the courts had long been achieving the same result by treating maintenance
and support obligations as nonprovable and therefore nondischargeable debts.
Clearly, both the legislative and judicial views of this exception indicate that the
non-bankrupt spouse's need for continued maintenance and support outweighs the
bankrupt's need for a fresh start.
Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten,
52 IND. L.J. 469, 473 (1977).
V See Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d
678 (9th Cir. 1975); in re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974). But see DeMilo v. Watson,
166 Ohio St. 433, 143 N.E. 2d .707 (1957). In this action for enforcement of a divorce judg-
ment, the court stated that there was no need to distinguish between support payments
and property settlement because the purpose of alimony is to effect an equitable adjustment
of property rights.
One commentator would challenge dischargeability of property settlements on the
grounds that in most marriages the assets are so limited that the property settlement actually
constitutes part of the support of the obligee spouse and children, and should therefore be
exempt from discharge. Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce:
The Support Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405, 433 (1975).
1977]
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made whether the ex-wife's claim is provable under the Bankruptcy
Act. 38 If it is, she must stand in line with the husband's other creditors
for a share of the estate. If her claim is not provable, the ex-wife is en-
titled to pursue the ex-husband after his discharge, and, if she is able,
to collect the full amount. Ex-wife's claim would be provable, and hence
dischargeable, if the subject matter of the claim is essentially a "prop-
erty settlement." Thus, in adjudicating the rights of the parties the
bankruptcy court must determine whether the wife's claim relates to
a property settlement or merely to support.
Federal courts refer to state law in determining whether transfers fol-
lowing dissolutions of marriage are property settlements or support.
Typical is In Re Alcorn,39 in which a referee held that the ex-husband's
obligation was dischargeable and ex-wife petitioned for review. Under
the decree of divorce, ex-husband was obligated to pay ex-wife fifty
dollars per month "for her maintenance and support," so long as she
remained unmarried and both parties lived. Ex-husband contended that
the support payments in question were but a part of an integrated
"property settlement." The district court concluded that the transfer
in issue arose out of the "husband's duty to support his wife," and not
out of a "bona fide property settlement." 40 According to the court,
In determing whether an agreement is [within the exemp-
tion for alimony] the court must look to the nature of the con-
tract itself and ascertain whether the contract is one which
merely provides for the division of property between the parties,
and as such is in lieu of alimony and a bona fide property
settlement contract, or whether the contract, although de-
nominated "property settlement contract" is one which em-
bodies within its terms the common law or statutory duty and,
consequently, is essentially a contract for .. .support.4
1
Although the court probably reached the correct result in its characterization
of the transfers involved - a result consistent with the Wolfe decision -
the court offered no clue regarding the standards to be applied other than
its reliance upon the husband's duty to support his wife.
More representative of Ohio practice is In Re Waller.42 In this case
38 Schiller v. Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1976), Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485 (10th
Cir. 1965). See Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: The Support
Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405,413 (1975); Note, Dissolution of
Marriage and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. L. J. 469,473 (1977).
But see Lee, Dischargeability of Debt: Alimony, Maintenance, or Support, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J.
175 (1976) (eschewing broad construction of alimony as frustrating the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act).
39 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). See also In re Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir.
1976), Jones v. Tyson, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1975), Caldwell v. Armstrong 342 F.2d 485
(10th Cir. 1965), Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. I11. 1934).
40 In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
41 Id.
42 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 26:395
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the Sixth Circuit adhered to the "support-property settlement" distinc-
tion and resolved all doubts in favor of the ex-wife, which is under-
standable when one considers that the Ohio courts of this period were
talking in post-dissolution alimony cases about a "husband's duty to
support his wife."4 3 In Waller, ex-husband had agreed in the separation
agreement to "pay and indemnify and hold wife absolutely harmless
from all existing obligations." One of these obligations, an account for
furniture,, was dispharged by ex-husband in bankruptcy proceedings.
The merchant brought an action against ex-wife, who then filed a mo-
tion to show cause against ex-husband. The bankruptcy judge had
concluded that ex-husband's obligation to hold wife harmless was a
"mere division of property" and not support. Hence, it too had been
discharged in bankruptcy." The Sixth Circuit reversed, 45 stating that it
is "not necessary for a divorce court in Ohio to state specifically
whether an award which it makes to a wife is alimony."4 6  Since the
divorce court in Waller had not applied any label at all to the transfer,
the Sixth Circuit felt free to construe ex-husband's indemnity obliga-
tion as non-dischargeable "support."47 Of course, if courts are allowed
such wide latitude in determining whether a decretal provision con-
stitutes property settlement or support, the practitioner's ability to
predict the outcome of a particular discharge in bankruptcy will largely
be defeated.
The analysis employed by the Sixth Circuit in Waller is far indeed
from the conclusion in Wolfe that a husband's common law or statutory
duty to support his wife while married is immaterial in determining the
form of the property settlement upon dissolution. Support payments
following dissolution, according to Wolfe, stem from the general mari-
tal property settlement and are merely one way to distribute marital
property. Wolfe would seem to compel this result when an ex-spouse
seeks to discharge in bankruptcy any post-nuptial transfer: If the
Ohio divorce decree provides for severable sustenance payments la-
beled as such, they will not be dischargeable in bankruptcy; everything
else, however, will be dischargeable. Consequently, the federal court's
application of Ohio law in bankruptcy proceedings should not be
troublesome since the characterization of a particular distribution of
13 Waller was decided prior to the 1974 amendments allowing "no-fault" divorce or
marital dissolution. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.61-.65 (Page Supp. 1976).
44 494 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1974).
15 The district court had affirmed the decree of the bankruptcy judge on review. See id.
at 448.
46 Id. at 449.
47 See, e.g., Stone v. Stidham, 96 Ariz. 235, 393 P.2d 92.3 (1964); Bradley v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957); Alexander v. Alexander, 526 P.2d 934 (Okla.
1974). These courts recognized wide latitude in appellate courts to construe payments
either as alimony or as property division when such payments are unlabeled in the original
settlement agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was incorporated into
the divorce decree. But see Phillips v. District Court, 95 Idaho 404, 509 P.2d 1325 (1973),
and Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958), both holding that once the
original agreement is incorporated into the divorce decree the trial court has jurisdiction
to find contempt for non-payment of support, but that appellate courts should not look
beyond the divorce decree in determining the nature of the payments.
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property should be evident from the terms of a well-drafted dissolution
decree.
Another question relating to the wife's enforcement of property
distribution decrees has caused considerable litigation around an
extremely narrow point: Can she order the ex-husband to show cause
for his refusal to make the transfer,4" or must she resort to the ordinary
civil processes for execution of judgments? 49
Most states resolve this question by again resorting to the familiar
shibboleth: If the transfer is a "property settlement" it must be en-
forced under the rules controlling the seizure and disposition of prop-
erty in satisfaction of judgments. The courts reason that enforcement of
mere property transfers by imprisonment would constitute imprison-
ment for debt, which is prohibited by most state constitutions.50 But
if the transfer is founded upon the "duty of the husband to support his
wife," then the transfer is not a debt and it may be enforced by con-
tempt.," Thus, in determining whether the transfer is enforceable by
contempt, most courts attempt to determine whether it is intended as
"support" for the ex-wife. 52  If it is, it is so enforceable despite the use
4' The Ohio contempt statute provides in relevant part: "A person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished as for a contempt: (A) Disobedience of, or resistence to, a
lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment or command of a court or an officer." OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2705.02 (Page 1954). Section 2705.03 authorizes a hearing on the contempt
order. Section 2705.05 provides for punishment by imprisonment for up to ten days, or a
fine of up to $500, or both. Section 2705.06 provides that when the contempt consists of
an omission to do an act which the accused can yet perform, the contemnor may be
imprisoned until the act is performed.
4' The requirements for execution against the property of a judgment debtor, and the
exemptions to which he is entitled, are set forth in Chapter 2329 of the Ohio Revised
Code. Chapter 2331 provides for execution against the judgment debtor's person. A
judgment creditor is authorized to obtain body attachment when the judgment debtor
fraudulently attempts to place his property beyond the reach of the judgment creditor.
OHIO REV. COOE ANN. § 2331.02 (Page 1954).
51 See, e.g., OHIO CoNsT. art. 1, § 15.
1' See, e.g., State, ex rel Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N.E. 564 (1902); and
Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957). In Cook, the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld against constitutional attack the use of contempt proceedings in enforcing
alimony decrees, stating that:
[alimony] is not a debt in the sense of a pecuniary obligation; it arises from a duty
which the husband owes as well to the public as to the wife .... The court does
not decree alimony as a debt to the wife, or as damages to be paid to her by her late
husband, but as a part of the estate standing in his name in which she has a right to
share. . . .The withholding of this allowance, therefore, by the late husband,
when able to respond, is a refusal to abide by and perform the order and decree of
the court, and it is difficult to see why such refusal should not be punished as con-
tempt ...
66 Ohio St. 566, at 572-73; 64 N.E. 567, at 568-69. The enforcement of child support orders
and decrees has also been held not to be within the constitutional inhibition for imprison-
ment for debt. Slawski v. Slawski, 49 Ohio App. 100, 195 N.E. 258 (1934).
52 The ex-husband's support obligation typically is construed broadly. In Phillips v.
District Court, 95 Idaho 404, 509 P.2d 1325 (1973) the court upheld ex-wife's claim that
ex-husband was in contempt of court for failing to make support payments. The con-
tractual provision in issue consisted of a release by ex-wife of "all claims whatsoever upon
the husband for a further division of the community property, alimony, support and main-
tenance . . . except the right to demand performance of all the undertakings of the
husband." 95 Idaho at 406, 509 P.2d at 1327. Ex-husband had failed to make automobile
payments. In Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958) the court stated
[Vol. 26:395
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of a syllogism in describing the genesis of the transfer. After Wolfe, of
course, the Ohio courts cannot appropriately speak in terms of the
husband's duty to support his wife following dissolution of the mar-
riage.5 3
The Ohio courts have split on the use of the contempt power to en-
force post-dissolution transfers of property. At least two courts of ap-
peal54 hold that the characterization of the transfer as support or a
property settlement is insignificant. What is significant, according to
one of these courts, is the language of the decree. 55  If the decree or-
ders either spouse to make a property or money transfer to the other,
it is enforceable by contempt.56 Other Ohio courts still adhere to the
distinction, as they see it, between support payments and property set-
tlements. Under this view, only those payments characterized by the
court as support are enforceable by contempt.
5 7
In Hogan v. Hogan,58 a separation agreement which required the
husband to transfer certain property to the wife had been merged into
a judgment of divorce which ordered him to do so.59 When the husband
that the only relevant inquiry is "whether there is a reasonable relation between the pro-
vision here sought to be enforced . .. and the duty of [the husband] to support [the
wife]."
The Ohio cases tend also to reflect this liberal view of support. While there exists some
authority for the proposition that the support obligation is narrowly defined, Traylor v.
Traylor, 46 Ohio App. 87, 187 N.E. 722 (1933) (mortgage and property tax payments held
to be in nature of property settlement and thus not enforceable by contempt), more recent
decisions appear to construe the support obligation broadly. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters,
115 Ohio App. 443, 183 N.E.2d 431 (1962) ($400 lump sum "permanent alimony" payable
in $10 installments held to be enforceable by contempt proceedings). But see Hogan v.
Hogan, 29 Ohio App. 2d 69, 278 N.E.2d 367 (1972), in which the appellate court for
Cuyahoga County entirely abandoned the Peters rule as "arbitrary and artificial" in
application.
-' Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 411, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976). In an effort to clarify
what exactly the legal obligations of an ex-spouse are once the marriage is dissolved
the court stated in Wolfe: "Although post-marital alimony has been said to arise out of
the husband's duty to support his wife, . . . 'the legal obligation of the husband to furnish
support to the wife ceases upon the termination of the marriage relation.' " 46 Ohio St. 2d
at 410, 350 N.E.2d at 421 (quoting Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St. 1, 7 (1877) (emphasis
in the Wolfe opinion).
51 Hogan v. Hogan, 29 Ohio App. 2d 69, 278 N.E.2d 367 (1972); Peters v. Peters, 115
Ohio App. 443, 183 N.E.2d 431 (1962).
5 See Hogan v. Hogan, 29 Ohio App. 2d 69, 71, 278 N.E.2d 367, 369 (1972).
11 The trial court in Peters v. Peters, 115 Ohio App. 443, 183 N.E.2d 431 (1962),
issued a decree awarding the spouse a lump sum payable in weekly installments as per-
manent alimony. While the decree specified the amounts and a provision for accelleration
of payments upon default, the decree's language did not specifically order the defendant to
make the installment payments. The court held that the decree was enforceable by contempt
proceedings, reasoning that a mere adjudication of the amount of alimony by the court
amounted to "a direct command" to the defaulting party. The court based this liberal rule
on the "public interest involved in both temporary and permanent alimony." Id. at
447-448, 183 N.E.2d at 434.
51 Saslow v. Saslow, 104 Ohio App. 157, 147 N.E.2d 262 (1957); Addison v. Addison,
95 Ohio App. 191, 118 N.E.2d 225 (1953); Traylor v. Traylor, 46 Ohio App. 87, 187 N.E.
722 (1933).
29 Ohio App. 2d 69, 278 N.E.2d 367 (1972).
59 The decree in Hogan provided in pertinent part: "The court finds that the parties
have, prior to the conclusion of this hearing, entered into a separation agreement which is
1977)
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subsequently refused to pay, the wife prompted a contempt proceeding
against him. The defendant contended that the incorporated separa-
tion agreement was in fact a property settlement. Applying the general
rule that property settlements are not enforceable by contempt, the
trial court dismissed the ex-wife's motion.60 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth District reversed, holding that all court orders are enforce-
able by contempt whether they provide for alimony, property settle-
ments, or both.61  Since the defendant had violated a court order, he
could be punished for his contempt if the violation was willful and he
had the means to make the transfer. 62 Willfulness reasoned the court,
established his contemptuous conduct, and his ability to make the trans-
fer precluded a claim of imprisonment for debt.63
In so holding, the Eighth District rejected the conclusion of the
Third District in Saslow v. Saslow. 4 There, a transfer of real estate was
supposed to have been made by the husband in "full payment" of per-
manent alimony. The decree provided, however, that the wife was to
reconvey the real estate under certain conditions, which she subse-
quently refused to do. The court concluded, after applying the "alimony-
fair, just and equitable, and orders that said agreement . . . be incorporated herein ...
and its terms ordered into execution." Id. at 76 n. 2, 278 N.E.2d at 372 n. 2.
60 Id. at 70-71, 278 N.E.2d at 368.
61 Id. at 70, 278 N.E.2d at 368.
62 Id. at 71, 278 N.E.2d at 369 (citing Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 198
N.E. 579 (1935). In Holloway, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an alimony decree which
incorporated a separation agreement between parties was enforcible by contempt pro-
ceedings. At issue before the court was whether contempt proceedings to enforce obliga-
tions based originally upon contract, but subsequently incorporated into a divorce decree,
violates the Ohio Constitution's prohibition on imprisonment for debt, OHIO CONST. art. 1,
§ 15. The Hogan court followed the supreme court's reasoning in Holloway which found
the contractual obligation merged into the divorce decree: "[T]he inquiry is not whether
the alimony obligor has paid the amounts provided for in the contract, but whether he had
paid the amounts ordered by a decree of court." Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St., at
217, 198 N.E. at 58.
6' The Hogan opinion briefly addressed some possible defenses to contempt proceed-
ings enforcing decretal provisions: that the act or omission was not willful, that the decree's
provisions had already been complied with, or that the trial court had exceeded its
authority in decreeing the provisions currently before the court for enforcement. In cases
in which the trial court incorporates a separation agreement, the Hogan court expressed
doubts whether the last defense could be effective in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958). Robrock was an
expansion upon the supreme court's decision in Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214,
198 N.E. 579 (1935), holding that an incorporated separation agreement is merged into
the decree and is thereby enforcible by contempt proceedings notwithstanding its con-
tractual origins. In the fourth paragraph of the Robrock syllabus the majority stated that
in order to allow a court "to give effect to a separation agreement [the court] has the power
to incorporate it in the divorce decree or base the decree on its provisions, even though the
court, in the absence of an agreement of the parties, would not have the power to make the
resultant decree." Four years subsequent to the Eighth District's Hogan decision the Ohio
Supreme Court, in Nokes v. Nokes, 47 Ohio St. 2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 174 (1976),. questioned the
validity of paragraph four of Robrock. While the outcome in the Nokes decision did not
turn on the question of whether a court could enforce decretal provisions beyond its
statutory authority, the court's language in Nokes indicates that colatteral attack upon a
court's abuse of authority in enforcing decretal provisions based on incorporated
separation agreements may remain a valid defense to contempt proceedings.
04 104 Ohio App. 157, 147 N.E.2d 262 (1957).
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property settlement" rule, that the transfer was not support and could
not be enforced by contempt.
6 5
The Eighth District rejected the Saslow reasoning outright in
Hogan, creating an apparent conflict which would ordinarily be re-
solved by the Ohio Supreme Court. Unfortunately, Wolfe does not deal
directly with alimony enforcement procedures, and it is difficult to predict
the ultimate outcome on this point. However, Wolfe should be helpful
to those courts which do apply the "support-property settlement" rule
in making the appropriate distinction for purposes of contempt.
Nevertheless, some guesses can be made about the current status
of alimony contempt in Ohio. Interestingly, in Saslow the court held
that lump-sum property settlements are not enforceable by contempt
since a court's jurisdiction over such settlements ends with the original
decree.66  Of course, Wolfe said exactly the same thing about alimony
property settlements in general, creating an exception for severable
sustenance payments. At a minimum it would seem that absent speci-
fic language in the decree ordering that a transfer be made, the su-
preme court will endorse show cause procedures protecting a party's
right to receive severable support since the receipt of such a transfer
vindicates an important state policy: preventing the recipient from
becoming a ward of the state. The right to receive other property, which
right, according to Wolfe, is not a right to support and hence indis-
tinguishable from the right to enforce an ordinary debt, will probably
be left to those enforcement devices applicable to ordinary judgments.
The conflict between the Eighth District in Hogan and the Third District
in Saslow is probably more apparent than real, for Hogan held only that a
party who violates a court order is subject to punishment for contempt. Thus,
if the decree dissolving the marriage specifically orders that a particular
transfer be made, then as Hogan points out the contempt statute by its terms
provides that the court can invoke its provisions against a recalcitrant
transferor. The Eighth District's view is persuasive. It would seem that the
result of a willful violation of the court order should be the same regardless of
the characterization of the property or the nature of the transaction which
gave rise to the order.
If the supreme court does ultimately conclude that only sustenance
orders can be enforced by contempt, then whether the transfer involved
is indeed a property settlement or sustenance will be answered, as
Wolfe indicates, by the form in which it is cast. Conversely, if the court
concludes that all post-dissolution alimony is enforceable by contempt,
then form will still control, since according to the Hogan rationale, and
the contempt statute, if the judgment entry is drafted so that the de-
fendant is ordered to make a transfer he will be required to show cause
for his failure to do so. 67
65 Id. at 165, 147 N.E.2d at 268 (following Traylor v. Traylor, 46 Ohio App. 87, 187
N.E. 722 (1933)).
66 104 Ohio App. at 166, 147 N.E.2d at 269.
67 See Hogan v. Hogan, 29 Ohio App. 2d at 71, 278 N.E.2d at 369.
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III. CHILD SUPPORT
The statute which requires the husband to support his wife during
the marriage also imposes upon the husband the primary obligation of
support for his children.68 Like the wife's duty to support herself while
married, a mother's duty to support her children is a secondary one. A
few efforts have been made recently by the General Assembly to equal-
ize the support burden during the marriage, but these have been un-
successful. Ohio legislators seem to believe that a wife's responsibility
to her family is still to take care of the children and, if she insists upon
working, to earn discretionary income. Although this view has been re-
jected by the Internal Revenue Service 9 and, presumably, by the large
number of mothers who must work out of necessity, the basic philoso-
phy still governs the common law marital regime.
On January 1, 1974 the General Assembly lowered the age of
majority in Ohio to eighteen. 70 Fathers bound by previous child support
orders to support their children until age twenty-one soon stopped
making payments to ex-wives for children who had reached eighteen.
Further, fathers who were bound by separation agreements merged
into divorce decrees to support their children until age twenty-one also
stopped paying child support when their children reached the new
age of majority. On motions to show cause, the Ohio Supreme Court
was ultimately asked whether the new age of majority applied to old
child support orders.
In Nokes v. Nokes,7' the court held that the new legislation lowering
the age of majority was to be given prospective application only, thus
leaving intact child support orders not founded on separation agree-
ments that had been journalized before the effective date of the legis-
lation. In a companion case, Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld,72 the court ap-
plied the same rule to divorce decrees which had incorporated separa-
tion agreements providing that the father would support his children
until age twenty-one.
In Nokes, v. Nokes,7' the court said that once a child turns
eighteen and is no longer in high school, domestic relations courts lose
jurisdiction over him. Hence, they lose any further power to enforce
their child support decrees.73 The court stated in Rosenfeld, consistent
with what it already had concluded in Wolfe, that once a separation
agreement is incorporated into a decree it loses its independent exis-
tence as a contract. Under the Nokes reasoning, the court loses its juris-
61 Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
69 See I.R.C. § 44A (credit for dependent care services); I.R.C. § 7 7 01(a)(1 7 ) (defini-
tion of husband and wife).
70 Effective January 1, 1974, the age of majority in Ohio was changed from 21 to 18
years of age by an amendment to Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page Supp. 1976), which
now reads: "All persons of the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal
disability, are capable of contracting and are of full age for all purposes."
71 47 Ohio St. 2d 1, 351 N.E. 2d 174 (1976).
72 47 Ohio St. 2d 12, 351 N.E.2d 181 (1976).
73 See Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935).
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diction over the children, and its ability to enforce its decree, at the age
of majority.7 4
There is, of course, nothing in either Wolfe, Nokes, or Rosenfeld
to prevent a parent from entering into a contract in which he agrees to
support the children beyond age eighteen. If the contract is kept inde-
pendent of the dissolution decree, the obligation will be a contractual
one enforceable in courts having general jurisdiction rather than one
imposed by a court that loses jurisdiction when the children reach ma-
jority. 75
In any event, it is obvious from Nokes and Rosenfeld that Ohio law
no longer requires either parent to support the children beyond age
eighteen, unless required to do so under a decree of divorce entered
before the effective date of the legislation lowering the age of majority.
Following the rule established in Wolfe for alimony, the Ohio Supreme
Court has also made it clear that identical support responsibilities will
be imposed upon the parents, whether agreed to in a separation agree-
ment later incorporated into a decree, or imposed by court order.
Despite these recent cases, some significant child support questions
remain. For example, the relative responsibilities of fathers and moth-
ers to support their children are still unclear, notwithstanding the recent
drift toward parental equality. Some guarded speculations about these
responsibilities follow.
In determining how and by whom the children of a marriage will be
supported following its dissolution, domestic relations courts must apply
the Ohio child support statute.76 This statute is quite similar in terms
to the alimony statute77 and should be read to effectuate the same pur-
pose. The intended purpose of these laws can be stated as follows: sup-
port payments, whether alimony-sustenance or child support, should be
awarded on the basis of need and not according to the sex of the sup-
porting obligor. Recent Ohio cases lend support to the conclusion that
the Ohio alimony and child support statutes should be read in pari
materia. They hold that while the husband still has the primary duty of
support during the marriage, both parties are equally responsible for
supporting the children following dissolution.
State v. Oppenheimer78 was a criminal prosecution against a divorced
father for non-support of his children, who resided with the mother
under the terms of the divorce decree. The defendent did not deny that
he possessed the means to support the children. 79 He did show, how-
71 But see Bugay v. Bugay, 7 Ohio Op. 3d 336 (Ct. App. 1977), a questionable opinion
which reaches a contrary result.
" See Tefft v. Tefft, 73 Ohio App. 399, 54 N.E.2d 423 (1943); Danner v. Danner, 57
Ohio L. Abs. 30,93 N.E.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1950).
76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05 (Page Supp. 1976). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
1 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976) (husband has a duty to support his wife and minor children
out of his own property).
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1976).
7646 Ohio App. 2d 241, 348 N.E. 2d 731 (1975).
76 The prosecution was brought in juvenile court under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.21
(Page Supp. 1976). The court cited OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.21(B) (Page Supp. 1976)
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ever, that they had received adequate support from the mother. On re-
view of his conviction, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that the criminal non-support statute applies to "persons" rather
than fathers and mothers, and that the statute places "an equal burden
on both parents."8  The court described the current status of Ohio
child support law as follows: "Present Ohio law holds that equal pro-
tection requires that the burden to support minor children be placed
equally on both parents to the extent of their ability and means to the
end that children should be adequately supported by tfieir parents81
Since the mother was providing the children with adequate support, the
court concluded that the father had not breached any duty toward them
and could not, therefore, be prosecuted under the criminal statute. The
court pointed out that the parties had been separated by a decree of
dissolution which ordered the defendant to pay $260 per month to sup-
port his children, and that the ex-wife could have enforced the decree by
civil contempt proceedings. The court concluded that such a child support
decree would have been a -post-dissolution substitute for the statutory
obligation of the father to support the children during the marriage. 2
More directly to the point is Hill v. Hill.8 3 In Hill, the First District
Court of Appeals considered the question whether the child support
statute84 which applies to dissolution of marriage imposed obligations
different from those imposed upon the parties under the marriage support
statute. The court upheld an order compelling the mother of children
not in her custody to make child support payments to the father, con-
cluding that the child support statute, like the criminal non-support stat-
ute, applies by its terms to persons and not to husbands and wives. So
construed, the statute requires that child support following dissolution be
determined by the children's need for support and the ability of the parties
to provide it, and not according to the traditional roles of the parents in the
marriage relation.8 5
Oppenheimer and Hill are strikingly similar to Wolfe in at least one
important respect. They recognize that certain statutory obligations are
imposed by Ohio law upon men to support their families during marriage,
but that these obligations terminate and other statutes control when the
marriage is dissolved. Upon dissolution of marriage the woman must
support herself according to her means, and she and the father must sup-
port the children according to their respective abilities. Both the man and
the woman will have received, through the dissolution of their marriage,
which provides that an inability to pay support is an affirmative defense to such prosecution,
noting the similarity between a prosecution under this statute and the enforcement of
support orders in contempt proceedings.
80 46 Ohio App. 2d at 244, 348 N.E.2d at 736.
11 Id. at 248, 348 N.E.2d at 738.
82 Id. at 246, 348 N.E.2d at 737.
83 40 Ohio App. 2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 250 (1973).
14 Ono REv. COnE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
8 40 Ohio App. 2d at 4-5, 317 N.E. 2d at 253.
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alimony property settlements, as that term is used in Wolfe. In fashion-
ing a support order under the child support statute the court is mandated
to consider these settlements in determining exactly what responsibility
each of the parties must bear in supporting the children.88 Thus, Oppen-
heimer and Hill replicate in the child support area principles that Wolfe
established for alimony. Of course, Oppenheimer and Hill are not the
law of Ohio, but as consistent as they appear to be with Wolfe, they proba-
bly represent sound rules of child support law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of alimony and child support in Ohio has been reformulated to
reflect certain common principles. Post-dissolution alimony is now
regarded as a liquidation of the marital estate; it is a distribution to both
the husband and wife of marital property that may take several forms,
including support. Post-dissolution child support obligations have
become the responsibility of both parents and, if established by court order
after January 1, 1974, terminate at the age of majority. If alimony is
ordered in the form of support or "sustenance" from one spouse to the
other, the court will have continuing jurisdiction, as it does in child sup-
port cases, to modify its order for changed circumstances. Alternatively,
the husband and wife may agree to a property settlement which has no
alimony support characteristics. This property settlement cannot be
modified by the court, but is probably dischargeable in bankruptcy. If
the decree is properly drafted, the party who is entitled to receive an ali-
mony transfer of some kind can enforce it by contempt against the party
refusing to make the transfer. These are some of the more important con-
sequences suggested by the recent cases.
How are these consequences to be put into effect? Through a careful
adherence to form, the Ohio Supreme Court suggests. If post-dissolution
alimony in the form of support payments is to withstand challenge, it must
clearly be severable from the remainder of the property settlement. Thus,
the careful draftsman will label such payments as "periodic sustenance
payments to wife or husband," as the case may be, and expressly provide
in either the separation agreement or judgment entry that they are meant
to be "severable" and "independent" of the property settlement. If post-
dissolution alimony in the form of a property settlement without support
is to be used, the draftsman should label it as such and provide for the
transfer of its components in a lump sum or definite installments. Of
course, Wolfe will tolerate a little sloppy draftsmanship here, since all
post-marital distributions will be presumed to be property settlements
unless expressly labeled "sustenance."
The Wolfe court apparently looks unenthusiastically upon post-
decree alimony sustenance payments between ex-spouses as indicated
by its rule that such payments must be "clearly severable" from the rest of
the property settlement. If the alimony property settlement between the
husband and wife is to involve combinations of lump sum transfers and
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B), (E) (Page Supp. 1976).
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sustenance, the language of the decree should state that the support pay-
ments are intended to be independent of the general property settlement.
The responsibility for child support on the part of either parent now
ends at the age of majority, and it is clear that the father will not be
ordered to provide such support solely on the basis of his sex or status.
Child support awards must now be based upon the needs of the children
and the ability of either parent to provide it. Then, too, there is nothing in
the law to prevent the parents from reaching a supplemental agreement
concerning child support which provides that one or both of them are to
support a child beyond the age of majority. This supplemental agreement
will be enforceable as a contract in courts of common pleas.
And so, for better or for worse, the law of post-dissolution alimony and
child support in Ohio has joined the Twentieth Century despite the State's
reluctance to modernize the actual marital relationship itself. It would
probably be more pragmatic to apportion the responsibilities in that
relationship along functional lines rather than in accordance with sex as they
are now. Still, the modem family is reorganizing itself; and so long as this
lasts the General Assembly might more profitably wait to see what happens
before locking the family into another marital regime.
[Vol. 26:395
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